The court distinguished proof of the physical taking from proof of theft. It stressed that the State bore the criminal burden of proof; Mercer did not have to establish that an approved loan existed. No statutes or other governing legal rules were supplied, so the judgment applied the stated criminal burden without adding sentencing rules.
The manager, Tessa, said she had not authorized a saw loan. The court treated that account as evidence of her own decision, not direct proof of what Mercer understood or intended. It also noted that some of her statements were relayed through counsel rather than given as admitted testimony or independent documents.
Shop employee Nora Bell testified that staff sometimes borrowed equipment with approval. However, she could not identify who could approve this particular loan or say whether approval had been given. Her evidence therefore established neither permission nor its absence.
A Monday message on Mercer’s phone indicated that Tessa expected something to be returned that day, but did not identify the item. Mercer said it concerned the saw; Tessa said it concerned a rolling cart. The court gave the message limited weight on permission and did not treat the loan explanation as proven.
The unanswered Tuesday call and return after police contact weighed against Mercer’s position. However, the record did not explain the unanswered call, and the later return did not by itself establish intent when the saw was taken. Taken together, the competing inferences left reasonable uncertainty.
“That limitation, however, does not fill the State’s separate gap in proving Ellis’s intent.”