Madison small-claims court grants $240 deposit refund for furniture assembly not provided

The small-claims court in Madison granted Elena Brooks’s claim for the return of a $240 furniture-assembly deposit, directing Calvin Mercer to repay the full amount. Although Brooks did not prove the precise agreed appointment date, the court found that she paid for assembly that Mercer did not provide.

The court awarded no additional amount. Brooks sought only the return of her deposit, and the record supported no further award.

The ruling separated two questions: whether Mercer failed to attend on a proven booking date, and whether he could retain payment for work not performed. Uncertainty about the first did not defeat Brooks’s claim on the second.

The signed booking form was the strongest direct evidence of the parties’ agreement. It recorded furniture assembly in Madison and a $240 deposit to be credited toward the assembly price. The appointment-date field was blank, and the form contained no forfeiture term allowing Mercer to keep the deposit if the work was not done.

A described June 2, 2025 phone exchange supported Brooks’s account that she proposed June 7 at 9. Mercer acknowledged the message and receipt of the deposit but did not expressly repeat the date. The original conversation, including timestamps and surrounding context, was not displayed in the record, limiting the weight the court gave its description.

Applying the recorded rules on proof, reliable records and contractual wording, the court found that the precise appointment date remained unproven. Mercer’s arrival on June 14 did not establish that either Saturday had been agreed.

The evidence nevertheless established nonperformance. Both parties’ accounts agreed that Mercer did not assemble the furniture, and he had no proof of later completion or an offered reschedule. The court found that the failure mattered to the bargain because assembly was the service for which Brooks paid.

The remedy matched the proven loss: the $240 deposit. Mercer identified no completed work, expense, forfeiture provision or other supported basis for a deduction. The court did not need to find dishonesty or deliberate disregard of an agreed date to order repayment.

Brooks argued that she paid for a service she never received and should recover the full deposit regardless of the scheduling dispute. She relied on the booking form, the described June 2 exchange and Mercer’s acknowledgment that his June 14 visit did not result in assembly.

Her side also alleged deliberate exploitation and a scam. The court treated those statements as allegations rather than established facts and found them unnecessary to resolve the deposit claim.

Mercer argued that the blank date field and his reply to the scheduling message did not prove a June 7 appointment. He relied on his June 14 arrival as evidence of an attempt to perform and asked the court to deny or reduce repayment.

He nevertheless acknowledged that he had not performed the assembly and had no evidence of later service, rescheduling or another basis to retain the money. He identified no supported amount that could be deducted.

Brooks found Mercer through a website advertisement and hired him to assemble furniture at her Madison apartment. Both signed the booking form, and she paid the $240 deposit.

Brooks maintained that she booked June 7, 2025. Mercer did not attend that day and arrived the following Saturday, June 14, without completing the assembly.

The outcome provides full recovery of the deposit for the unprovided service. Its limits are equally clear: the court did not establish the precise booking date, find fraud or award damages beyond the money paid.