District Court awards $180 refund after one shelf fails to fulfil two-shelf agreement

The District Court awarded Nina Bellamy the $180 partial refund she sought from Grant Wilkes after he supplied and installed only one of two promised shelves. Presiding Judge Austin entered judgment for Bellamy on October 11, 2026, finding that the original $360 agreement remained in effect.

The dispute turned on whether Bellamy’s permission to install the available shelf meant the second shelf could come later—or that Wilkes could treat the one-shelf installation as the completed job. Austin found that the evidence did not clearly establish her agreement to the latter.

Austin found that the original agreement required Wilkes to supply and install two matching shelves. Bellamy allowed him to install the single shelf he brought, but that permission did not clearly establish that she had cancelled the remaining obligation.

The written quote promised two shelves. Although Wilkes maintained that the price covered his visit, materials and installation rather than a separate charge for each shelf, the judge found no clear evidence that Bellamy knowingly accepted one shelf for the same $360 price.

The decisive distinction was between accepting part of the work and mutually agreeing to change the bargain. Without a clear agreement to change its essential terms, the original contract continued to govern; installing one shelf alone did not fulfil it.

Bellamy said she permitted the first shelf to be installed temporarily and still expected the second. She acknowledged that no further installation date had been set and that her wording could be interpreted differently, but maintained that she had not agreed to cancel the second shelf. She also said there had been no discussion or agreement to change the price.

Wilkes sought dismissal of the refund request, saying he understood Bellamy’s permission as acceptance of a changed, one-shelf job. He acknowledged, however, that the quote and receipt specified two shelves for $360.

Wilkes also acknowledged that he had not explicitly told Bellamy the second shelf would not be installed or that the price would remain unchanged. He could identify no clear written agreement changing those terms or evidence that she expressly accepted his interpretation.

The transaction concerned two matching shelves for Bellamy’s Portland apartment. The parties’ differing accounts arose after Wilkes arrived with just one shelf and Bellamy allowed installation to proceed without arranging a return date.

Austin described the $180 award as the requested partial refund and a reasonable resolution on the limited facts presented. The judgment did not provide a separate valuation of the missing shelf or allocate the price between materials and labour.

The judgment also expressly stated that it was based on the stated facts and subject to any additional evidence or applicable law presented during the hearing. Its conclusion therefore rests on the limited record, particularly the absence of a clear mutual agreement to reduce the promised work.