Lyon court orders return of €320 balcony-screen advance after installation never occurred

Élodie Martin asked the Tribunal judiciaire de Lyon to order Nicolas Baret to return a €320 advance paid for the supply and installation of a bamboo privacy screen on her balcony. She also sought €40 for a temporary screen purchased after the planned work did not occur.

The agreed total price was €640, with €320 paid in advance by bank transfer. Martin’s central case was straightforward: the screen was never installed, she waited several weeks, and she then requested her money back.

“I paid €320 for a simple balcony screen that Mr. Baret never installed.”

• Claimed relief: €360 total.
• Awarded relief: €320.
• Core issue: whether the uninstalled work justified return of the advance.

The record supported two key points: Martin made a €320 bank transfer, and the bamboo balcony screen was never installed. Messages between the parties were also before the court.

Those messages complicated the timing issue. Baret relied on wording that he would aim for installation before the end of May if bamboo was available, rather than an unequivocal fixed-date commitment. He also referred to a later proposed installation slot, materials preparation, a receipt for panels, and a workshop photograph.

The court found that Martin had established “payment of the €320 advance and that the balcony screen was never installed.”

• Bank-transfer proof established payment of the €320 advance.
• Messages documented the parties’ communications about timing.
• No installation was completed.
• The record did not establish the €40 temporary-screen expense in sufficient detail.

Maître CAZAGOU, acting for Martin, argued that Baret had not performed the agreed installation, had become difficult to contact, and had not provided a reliable replacement appointment. The advocacy repeatedly tied the requested repayment to the absence of completed work.

Baret’s position was that the case did not show clear non-performance. He emphasized that the end-of-May timing was conditional on material availability, that a later installation slot had been offered and refused, and that preparations had already begun for the order.

Baret argued that the advance “cannot be returned automatically” without considering whether materials had already been prepared.

• Martin’s position: payment plus non-installation required repayment.
• Baret’s position: conditional timing, a proposed later slot, and preparation defeated automatic full repayment.
• The dispute turned less on whether money changed hands than on whether Baret had a sufficient basis to retain it.

The decisive point was the bounded remedy supported by the record. Martin proved the transfer and the absence of installation; those facts gave the court a clear basis to order return of the advance.

Baret’s conditional-timing and preparation arguments created uncertainty about the missed May target, but they did not establish completed performance or a sufficiently clear basis for retaining the entire €320. The court treated the matter as an advance-payment dispute rather than a documented damages claim.

The record did not justify “keeping the full advance without clearer proof of completed performance or a lawful basis to retain the money.”

• Proof of payment was direct.
• Non-installation was undisputed on the record.
• The defense did not establish a complete justification for keeping the full advance.
• The narrower €320 remedy was better supported than the additional €40 request.

The Tribunal judiciaire de Lyon granted Martin repayment of the €320 advance. It did not award the additional €40 sought for a temporary screen.

The disposition was partial relief: Martin recovered the amount paid toward the unperformed installation, but not the separate consequential expense.

The court grants repayment of the €320 advance and does not add the separate €40 screen expense on this record.

• Amount claimed: €360.
• Amount awarded: €320.
• Disposition: partial relief.
• Currency: EUR.

Maître CAZAGOU successfully kept Martin’s claim focused on the strongest documented facts: the €320 transfer and the fact that no screen was installed. That framing aligned the requested remedy with the evidence ultimately accepted by the court.

The advocacy was less effective in answering the defense’s specific reliance on conditional timing and the alleged later installation slot. Even so, the core non-installation theory prevailed as to return of the advance.

Maître CAZAGOU “tied [the] request to non-performance of the agreed work.”

• Strength: linked the repayment request to non-performance.
• Strength: relied on the documented transfer.
• Weakness: did not fully answer the conditional end-of-May language.
• Weakness: did not directly resolve the alleged proposed-and-refused installation slot.

Martin did not prove the separate €40 temporary-screen expense with enough detail to obtain reimbursement. The record did not provide the necessary support for that additional item.

The messages also left Baret with a plausible argument that the May timing was conditional, not a firm deadline. That issue did not defeat repayment of the advance, but it narrowed the case and underscored the importance of precise written terms.

“The timing language in the messages gave the other side a plausible argument about a conditional May target.”

• No sufficient proof for the €40 expense.
• Conditional timing language weakened the deadline argument.
• The alleged later appointment remained a contested advocacy point.
• Preparation evidence was not itemized into a complete retention justification.

The decision shows the practical value of matching a remedy to what the record clearly proves. Where an advance is paid and the promised work is never completed, proof of payment and non-installation can support repayment even when the parties dispute scheduling details.

It also illustrates the limit of that approach. Additional expenses require their own evidentiary foundation, and a claimant seeking more than return of an advance must document those losses with comparable precision.

The €320 repayment was “the clearest bounded remedy.”

• Payment records can anchor an advance-repayment claim.
• Non-installation can be more decisive than disputed scheduling language.
• Separate losses require separate proof.
• Contract communications should clearly state whether dates are firm or conditional.

A more targeted presentation by Baret could have improved the defense if it had connected the panel receipt, workshop photograph, and alleged preparation to a clear, itemized explanation for retaining some or all of the €320. On this record, those points did not establish a complete basis to keep the full advance.

For Martin, a more direct response to the conditional timing language and the alleged refused appointment could have made the liability analysis cleaner. Better proof of the €40 temporary-screen purchase might also have changed the damages outcome, though the record does not establish that it would have done so.

The defense lacked “a complete justification for keeping the full advance.”

• Baret needed clearer proof tying preparation to a justified retention amount.
• Martin needed stronger proof of the €40 expense.
• Both sides would have benefited from a more precise account of the later proposed appointment.

Take on a similar civil contract dispute in Legal Arena: build the record around payment, performance, communications, and the exact remedy the evidence can support.

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• Test a claim for return of an advance.
• Challenge conditional scheduling language.
• Develop proof for consequential expenses.