Eugene small claims court denies $240 table deposit refund over unproven missed deadline

The small claims court in Eugene denied Nina Mercer’s request to recover a $240 deposit from Owen Bell for work on her dining table. It entered judgment for Bell and ordered no payment from either party because Mercer had not proved that the table was unready at the deadline that triggered her contractual refund right.

The dispute centred on a Saturday completion promise and a short exchange about Sunday pickup. Although the court accepted that Mercer had agreed Sunday was a workable collection time, it did not find that she had expressly surrendered the written refund protection.

The signed work order set a total price of $480, acknowledged the $240 deposit and required the table to be ready by noon on Saturday, June 13, 2026. If it was not ready, Mercer could cancel and recover her deposit.

That promise was conditional. The document established what would entitle Mercer to a refund, but did not itself establish that the deadline had been missed. The court found no presented record or sufficiently detailed account showing the table’s condition at Saturday noon.

Bell also supplied no proof that the table was ready. But that absence did not transfer the burden to him: Mercer still had to establish the fact on which her refund claim depended. The court left readiness unresolved rather than finding that Bell had completed the work on time.

The acknowledged screenshot proved a narrower point. It showed Bell asking for Sunday-noon collection and Mercer responding that Sunday could work. Because the image ended immediately after her reply, it established neither further conditions nor an express waiver of the refund term. The Sunday pickup finding therefore did not determine the outcome.

Mercer relied on the signed work order and argued that willingness to consider Sunday did not replace the Saturday deadline or remove her refund right. She said Sunday depended on confirmation by Friday, but acknowledged having no message proving that condition.

Bell argued that Mercer had accepted an extra day and that he continued preparing the table in reliance on her reply. He pointed to the screenshot and questioned why she had not cancelled on Saturday if Saturday completion was essential.

The court treated that question as argument, not evidence of readiness or of the full terms of any change. Mercer sought only her deposit, with no additional damages.

Bell requested the extra day on the Friday before the scheduled completion date. Mercer later cancelled before Sunday pickup. The evidentiary record before the court consisted principally of the signed work order and the two-message screenshot; the remaining conversation was unavailable.

The judgment draws a limited distinction between proving a contractual right and proving the event that activates it. Mercer established the refund provision, but not its trigger. The decision resolves this claim on the evidence presented without establishing that the table was ready or that the Sunday exchange erased the written refund protection.