Original in-game verdict

Background 1. Common Ground Alliance challenges a letter from the Political Funding Standards Office concerning two donations totalling £72 million. The letter said, “Please arrange return” within 14 days, in anticipation of a proposed overseas-donor restriction. It also invited the Alliance to provide information explaining why repayment should not be required before the Office determined its next steps. The letter identified no currently effective repayment rule. 2. The Office’s published policy extract describes the restriction as a consultation proposal only, not in force, with final wording and commencement undecided. The Alliance asks for withdrawal of the 14-day deadline and a replacement letter confirming that there is no present repayment obligation. The Office accepts that the letter was not a final repayment decision, but opposes any wording that would prevent a future repayment obligation from arising. Issues for determination 3. The issues are whether the letter imposed a present repayment obligation and, if not, what clarification or replacement wording is supported by the record. Under Rule 1, the Alliance, as the party seeking relief, must point to facts or records supporting it. Rule 45 requires an agency decision to have support in the record. Rule 47 recognizes that agency discretion has limits, and Rule 6 requires a remedy proportionate to the proven problem. Submissions of the parties 4. The Alliance relies on the letter’s direct 14-day return instruction. It argues that the Office should withdraw the deadline and issue a replacement letter confirming no present repayment obligation. Its submissions also dispute that a rule already required repayment. The Alliance does not provide a separate record showing that the Office treated the letter as a final decision in practice. 5. The Office argues that the letter must be read as a whole. It points to the invitation to explain why repayment should not be required before the Office decided next steps, and to the published extract showing that the restriction was only a proposal. The Office acknowledges that the 14-day wording was firm and alarming. It accepts that the letter was not a final repayment decision, but says the court should not declare that repayment can never be required under a future rule. Evidence and findings 6. The letter is presented in several copies, including exhibits 1-e1, 2-e1, 4-e1, and 6-e1. The parties accept that it is the letter sent, so its wording is reliable evidence of what the Alliance received. The repeated copies are not independent evidence of separate communications; they reproduce the same letter. The letter both directs return within 14 days and invites an explanation before the Office determines next steps. Both parts matter. 7. The proposal status extract, exhibit 2-e2, states that the restriction was not in force and that its final wording and commencement remained undecided. It supports the conclusion that the letter did not identify an existing rule requiring repayment. It does not establish what any future rule will say or whether such a rule will be adopted. 8. The Alliance’s submissions are arguments, not independent proof of how the Office treated the letter beyond the letter itself. The record contains no separate internal statement of intent, and the Office says none is shown. The court therefore gives greatest weight to the accepted letter and the published status extract. The Office’s express acceptance that the letter was not final is also relevant to the scope of the dispute, but does not erase the letter’s firm wording. Reasons 9. On the first issue, the Alliance has not proved that the letter imposed a present legal repayment obligation. The 14-day instruction strongly supports the Alliance’s concern that the letter communicated a demand. But the same letter expressly allowed the Alliance to explain why repayment should not be required before the Office determined next steps. The published extract confirms that the proposed restriction was not in force, and the letter identifies no other effective repayment rule. Read together, these records show a serious and confusing demand made in anticipation of a proposal, not a final decision establishing a present legal obligation. The issue is therefore not proven in the Alliance’s favour. 10. That conclusion does not mean the letter was clear or harmless. Its instruction to return £72 million within 14 days sits uneasily with its invitation to explain before the Office decides what to do. The Office itself acknowledges that the wording was alarming. A clarification is justified so that the Alliance is not left to treat the letter as a final repayment decision. This is consistent with Rule 45: the record supports the conclusion that no current repayment rule was identified, but it does not support treating the letter as a final determination. 11. On the second issue, the Alliance is entitled to a narrow clarification, but not the broadest possible assurance. The record supports stating that the letter did not itself make a final repayment decision or establish a present repayment obligation. It does not establish that repayment can never be required. The proposal extract expressly leaves final wording and commencement undecided. A statement foreclosing any future obligation would go beyond the evidence and could decide a matter that has not yet arisen. Rule 6 therefore favours limited relief matching the proven problem. 12. The Office’s position succeeds insofar as it resists a guarantee against any future repayment requirement. It does not defeat the Alliance’s request for clarification of the present letter’s status. The Alliance has obtained meaningful, but limited, relief. No monetary award is supported or sought on this record. Final order 13. The Alliance’s request is granted in part. The Office must withdraw the 14-day repayment instruction as a present demand and issue a replacement clarification stating that its letter was not a final repayment decision and did not establish a present repayment obligation. 14. The replacement clarification must not state that repayment can never be required. This judgment does not decide whether a future rule will be adopted, what its terms may be, or whether it could apply to these donations. Any such question must be assessed on the rule and record then applicable. 15. No monetary payment is ordered. The Alliance otherwise receives no broader relief. The result is partial relief for the plaintiff.