Maseru court protects journalist’s home address but declines to require video-only interview

A court hearing a criminal-investigation-related application in Maseru has partly granted journalist Thabiso Rantso’s request for a protected interview, directing that his home address must not be required or disclosed as a condition of arranging it. The court ordered a process to settle remote-interview safeguards, but declined to make video the only permissible method.

Rantso said he feared revealing his location after an alleged abduction and threats linked to sensitive reporting. Investigating police official Mooketsi Seliane maintained that questioning should proceed under reliable, confidential conditions. The ruling protects residential privacy without treating the alleged attacks as proved.

• The parties and investigators must settle safeguards for a remote interview, covering identity verification, a room check, recording and document transmission through counsel.
• If remote arrangements cannot be agreed, a protected physical venue arranged through counsel remains available, without requiring disclosure of Rantso’s home address.
• The court denied a finding that the alleged abduction and threats were established and made no monetary award.

The decisive distinction was between protecting an address and proving the danger said to justify that protection. The court found no independent corroboration establishing the alleged abduction or threats. Two news reports described the interview dispute, but their secondary nature, limited independence, one outlet’s employment connection to Rantso and a reporting-timeline inconsistency reduced their evidential weight.

The correspondence nevertheless showed a genuine disagreement about interview method, rather than a refusal to investigate. Rantso’s initial video proposal omitted practical safeguards. Seliane’s rejection raised legitimate general concerns, but did not explain why every remote arrangement would be unacceptable.

A later, unsent draft supplied concrete safeguards, though it did not prove that they had been accepted or tested. With both sides ultimately accepting identity verification and a room check, the court found a basis for further arrangements—not for declaring a particular video setup ready.

The court treated the supplied constitutional privacy provision cautiously because its version in force at the relevant time was unconfirmed. The parties’ own positions supported protecting the home address; the constitutional provisions did not prescribe an interview method.

Rantso offered to cooperate by video with counsel verifying his identity, provided his home address was neither required nor disclosed. He accepted a room check and asked that counsel be held accountable for any location leak.

Seliane initially favoured a secure physical venue, citing confidentiality, identity verification and evidence security. By the final submission, his position had narrowed: remote safeguards could be considered and settled with investigators, with a protected physical meeting retained as a fallback. The court imposed no personal liability on counsel for a future leak.

Counsel’s letter of 8 October 2026 offered a video interview. Seliane’s reply the following day rejected video but offered a secure venue agreed through counsel, without demanding Rantso’s home address.

The ruling leaves the practical interview arrangements to be settled. It neither establishes that an attack occurred nor treats the failure to prove one as a reason to withhold the limited privacy protection supported by the record.